In Iraq’s Anbar Province, the local population is the center of gravity, as is typical in any counterinsurgency campaign. Thus, in order for the forces of order to appeal to the people, security forces need to effectively engage not only in combat but also in efforts to understand the population and how they live: their concerns, their expectations, their grievances, and what drives those dispositions, as well as how they live and act on those concerns, expectations, and grievances. Also important is gauging changes in their assessments and attitudes over time with the aim of identifying the areas of greatest need. To acquire a better understanding of how Anbaris live and how conditions in al-Anbar may have changed, RAND conducted two surveys evaluating living conditions in the province. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with a random sample of 1,200 heads of Anbari households (here, a household is defined as a family and other related individuals normally living in one housing unit) from May 28–June 10, 2008,2 and from May 23–June 9, 2009. Interviews were conducted by local Anbaris, who were trained over four days by instructors who had attended a separate training course held outside Iraq and conducted by RAND and subcontractor staff. While one might expect respondents in a conflict zone to react with some hesitancy toward a survey asking questions about their daily lives, the average response rate between the two surveys is 67 percent, a figure on par with response rates for similar surveys in other Middle Eastern countries.

 

 

 

The impassioned controversy that surrounded the decision to invade Iraq had the unfortunate consequence of impeding coordination of humanitarian relief operations. Now that the war has begun, it is important to deal with the urgent task of meeting the needs of the Iraqi people. That will require steps by those who were opposed to the war, in particular European governments and NGOs, to agree to work in close coordination with the United States and put their plans and their funding on the table. And it will require steps by the United States to eschew a dominant role in the post-conflict humanitarian effort and hand coordination over to the United Nations.
The scale of the humanitarian consequences of the war in Iraq is still unclear. But regardless of the war’s intensity or duration, there are bound to be new tragedies – to add to the devastation of Iraq’s economy and social fabric already caused by two earlier wars, twelve years of sanctions and an authoritarian government far more intent on itssurvival than on the well-being of its people. 

 

 

 

 

The Iraqi population is far more vulnerable to the shocks of war than it was in 1991, having been reduced after 12 years of sanctions to a state of dependency on government and international aid. Previously, Iraq was classified as a rapidly developing country with a modern urban infrastructure, an extensive welfare system, and a thriving middle class with significant personal assets.3 After 12 years of sanctions, the population has been impoverished and the civilian infrastructure remains fragile. Many characteristics of Iraqi society today are more comparable to the circumstances found in long-term refugee settings than to those in developing countries. 

 

 

 

 

Introduction

Iraq has been ravaged by conflict, crippling sanctions and immense human suffering for decades. The latest war, between Islamic State militants and the Iraqi government, has triggered one of the largest humanitarian crises in the world. The unprecedented scale of conflict over the past three years has forced a cumulative total of more than five million people from their homes across Iraq and left more than 11 million in need of humanitarian aid. In addition, over 247 000 people have sought refuge in Iraq, mainly in the Kurdistan region, as a result of the conflict in Syria. 

As combat operations in Mosul and other areas formerly held by Islamic State all but ended in 2017, Iraq is now entering a new phase of the humanitarian crisis. Key challenges are linked mostly to protection risks, such as those resulting from forced or obstructed returns of displaced populations, protracted displacement in camps and an alarming lack of access to basic services, for example in areas retaken from Islamic State. The economy is in tatters and people grapple with widespread poverty. 

 

 

 

 

 

Each year, Sida conducts a humanitarian allocation exercise in which a large part of its humanitarian budget is allocated to emergencies worldwide. This allocation takes place in the beginning of the year as to ensure predictability for humanitarian organizations and to allow for best possible operational planning. In an effort to truly adhere to the humanitarian principles, Sida bases its allocation decisions on a number of objective indicators and parameters of which the most important are related to the number of affected people, vulnerability of affected people and level of funding in previous years. One of the indicators is also related to forgotten crises in order to ensure sufficient funding to low profile crises. Besides this initial allocation, another part of the humanitarian budget is set aside as an emergency reserve for sudden onset emergencies and deteriorating humanitarian situations. This reserve allows Sida to quickly allocate funding to any humanitarian situation throughout the year, including additional funding to Iraq. For 2017, Iraq is allocated an initial 125 MSK in January 2017. Close monitoring of the situation in Iraq will continue throughout the year for potentially additional funds.

 

 

 

 

Iraq has a long history of social unrest and populationdisplacement dating back to the early 1990s. Several decades of conflict, which has undermined socioeconomic development and resulted in degradation of national infrastructure coupled with a recent resurgence of violence in the region, means that the country now faces a complex emergency situation and
humanitarian crisis.
As a result of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) offensives and the Anbar crisis, more than 1.8 million Iraqi people have been newly displaced since January 2014. The security situation in Anbar, Diyala, Ninewa and Salah-al Din remains volatile and unpredictable, rendering humanitarian access to these regions highly problematic (see figure 1.1 below). In the
north-eastern parts of the country, host communities are facing difficulties in assisting both the newly displaced Iraqi population and over 213 000

 

 

 

 

INTRODUCTION
1
After the liberation of Mosul, stakeholders must invest in what comes next. The coalition that
united against the Islamic State
is deeply divided by enmities and opposing agendas, the
ramifications of which
particularly on the humanitarian response, treatment of civilians and
post
-
IS reconstruction
will provide a bellwether as to whether Iraq’s future will be defined by
stability,
or a lack thereof. The main issues defining the post
-
Mosul landscape will not be the
provision of emergency aid
though crucial for lifesaving
, but rather, the interest and
capability of state actors to fairly treat Sunni IDPs, prevent the fracturing and
localisation of
armed groups and forced demographic displacement and establish a truly representative system
of governance providing Kurdish, Sunni, Shia and minority communities with political
sovereignty. Currently
,
there is neither basic willingness nor
capacity to carry out these policies.
A lack of trust in the state, the proliferation of weapons and internal and external forces vying
for dominance, and grievances both historical and inchoate will ultimately lead factions across
the Iraqi landscape
fro
m the level of individual, to family, to community, and ultimately to
ethnic and sectarian group
to take things into their own hands. Rebuilding a collective identity
is crucial to rebuilding Mosul or Ninewa. Currently
,
the ‘collective’ exists only as a po
int of policy
sublimated by splintering actors into infinite, opposing iterations

INTRODUCTION

After the liberation of Mosul, stakeholders must invest in what comes next. The coalition that united  against  the  Islamic  Stateis  deeply  divided  by  enmities  and  opposing  agendas,  the ramifications of which—particularly on the humanitarian response, treatment of civilians and post-IS reconstruction—will provide a bellwether as to whether Iraq’s future will be defined by stability,or  a  lack  thereof.  The  main  issues  defining  the  post-Mosul  landscape  will  not  be  the provision  of  emergency  aid—though  crucial  for  lifesaving—,  but  rather,  the  interest  and capability  of  state  actors  to  fairly  treat  Sunni  IDPs,  prevent  the  fracturing  and localisation  of armed groups and forced demographic displacement and establish a truly representative system of   governance   providing   Kurdish,   Sunni,   Shia   and   minority   communities   with   political sovereignty. Currently,there is neither basic willingness norcapacity to carry out these policies. A lack of trust in the state, the proliferation of weapons and internal and external forces vying for dominance, and grievances both historical and inchoate will ultimately lead factions across the  Iraqi  landscape—from  the  level  of  individual,  to  family,  to  community,  and  ultimately  to ethnic and sectarian group—to take things into their own hands. Rebuilding a collective identity is crucial to rebuilding Mosul or Ninewa. Currently,the ‘collective’ exists only as a point of policy sublimated by splintering actors into infinite, opposing iteration

 

 

 

.Abstract

The current situation in Iraq could be described as a ‘‘war on civilians’’, for it mainlyaffects the livelihood and well-being of the civilian population, while serious securityproblems prevent the Iraqi people from leading a normal life. Going beyond the directvictims of the conflict, this article deals with the daily problems faced by Iraqi society,namely the lack of security in terms of housing, education and health care, as well asprotection for the more vulnerable such as women and children. The forcible evictionof many Iraqis is, however, the main problem threatening the basic cohesion of Iraqisociety.A country of rich diversityIraq is a country of rich diversity that goes far back in history. Its current socialand political structure has its roots in Mesopotamia, a land of tribal, religious andevolving cultural interaction for more than seven thousand years. Settlement inMesopotamia began around 6500BCand represents the nucleus of the presentIraqi nation.1Naturally those settlements were first established on the banks ofrivers or close to other natural resources, where people had easy access to waterand open land that provided food for them and their animals. The eventualgrowth of these settlements into primitive communities coincided with theemergence of a number of ruling powers in that area, ranging from local toregional and continental dynasties. Locally developed civilizations, such as those o

 

 

 

ts likely impact must be taken into account whenconsidering such a step, to ensure that applying thissolution to the problems posed by Saddam Hussein isless damaging than the problems themselves.War is a major hazard to health and its impact may befelt months, years or decades later. Modern warfareusually leads to more casualties among civilians thancombatants (BMA 2001), while the destruction ofroads, railways, homes, hospitals, factories and sewageplants creates conditions in which the environment isdegraded and disease flourishes.  A populationsuffering from the immediate impact of war is moresusceptible to further health hazards and less able tomobilise its own resources for survival andreconstruction.This report describes the immediate and longer-termimpact of 1990-1 Gulf War and assesses the effects ofestablishing sanctions, no-fly zones and the Oil-for-Food programme. It concludes that the health of theIraqi people is now much worse than it was in 1990.A fresh conflict is likely to be wider-ranging and use